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POLITICS OF LAND: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Land Use in
California. By Robert C. Fellmeth. New York: Grossman Publishers,
1973. Pp. 715. $15.00 (hard cover), $5.95 (paperback).
REVIEWED BY ROBERT C. ELLICKSONt
In the summer of 1970, at the peak of his national influence,
Ralph Nader created a task force to investigate land resource policies
in the state of California. The group's 25 members, mostly Califor-
nians, were led by Robert C. Fellmeth, a veteran Nader lieutenant
who had co-authored an earlier study on the Federal Trade Commis-
sion1 and been sole author of another on the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. 2  Fellmeth and eight additional members of the task force
were attorneys; many other investigators had professional training of
some kind.
The task force's report was released in loose-leaf photocopy form
a year later, in August, 1971. It sweepingly condemned as spineless
and inept the government agencies involved in regulating use of Cali-
fornia's natural resources. The agencies attacked in the report were
outraged by it, and promptly issued press releases reproaching the task
force for inaccuracies, bias, and, by implication, immaturity.3 Since
the report had a limited circulation due to its method of reproduction,
the media ultimately bore the responsibility of assessing the charges
and countercharges for the general public. Most press reports con-
cluded the task force's work was intemperate and sloppy, and thus
largely dismissed it as unworthy of serious attention. It is clear that
the report boomeranged; the policies of the state agencies criticized in
the report seem to have been at most trivially affected by it; Nader's
national reputation, however, has been badly tarnished by the hostile
press reaction. The bloom is off the Nader rose. He faces unrest with-
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1963, Oberlin College; LL.B. 1966, Yale University.
1. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. ScHuLz, THE CONSuMER AND T E FEDERAL TRADE
COmSSiON (1969).
2. R. FFLLiMT, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMMIsSlON (1970).
3. See note 138 infra and accompanying text
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in his ranks,4 and an increasingly large fraction of his muckraking ef-
forts are being unfavorably received by his intended audience.'
Two years after the initial furor, a 700-page printed condensation
of the original 1200-page California land report was made available
under the title Politics of Land." Those who are interested can now
judge for themselves both the work of the task force and the reaction of
its critics. The book, deeply flawed though it is, merits attention as a
major new source on resource politics in California, and also as an ob-
ject lesson on the shortcomings of both amateur muckrakers and pro-
fessional journalists.
I. EDITORIAL WEAKNESSES
As project director, Fellmeth's basic objective should have been to
place workable limits on the task force's investigations. Nader's in-
vestigators score best when they tackle individual agencies like the ICC,
FTC, or Bureau of Reclamation. These bodies make manageable tar-
gets because their activities are well-chronicled in public documents,
their statutory authority and regulations are relatively easily penetrated,
and their managers are conveniently located in ironically vulnerable
stone edifices in downtown Washington, D.C. The regulation of Cali-
fornia's natural resources, however, is handled by a crazy quilt of state
and local agencies. Fellmeth decided to take them all on, at least by ex-
ample. In retrospect this was a mistake. In light of obvious constraints
of time and money, no task force recruited by Nader could possibly
have produced a competent critique of the institutions involved in agri-
culture, water, forestry, mining, transportation, and land use in Cali-
fornia. The task force reached too broadly, exceeded its grasp and
4. In the summer of 1970, some 15 Nader recruits in Washington, D.C. pro-
tested against Nader's remoteness and the coldness of his organizational structure. C.
McCARRY, CrIEN NADr 216 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McCARRY]. Morale sagged
badly on the Congress project, note 5 infra, in the summer of 1972:
The Nader white knight image was shattered for most of us early in the
summer, and that disillusionment weighed heavily on the project. An even
more serious repercussion is that I personally do not know a single profile
writer who would work for Nader again.
Szita, The Congress Report: A Raider Looks at Nader, Junis DOCTOR, Apr. 1973, at
35, 37.
5. The 1972 Congress project, involving hundreds of participants, centered on
the production of individual profiles of Congressmen. Most profiles eventually pub-
lished were generally perceived as sloppy and unoriginal. E. Z., Reactions: The Press
and the Public, JuRis DOCTOR, Apr. 1973, at 40.
6. R. FELLMETH, PoLITIcs OF LAND: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON
LND UsE iN CALIFORNLA (1973) [hereinafter cited to page number only].
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consequently failed to produce as effective a critique as would have re-
sulted from a more focused effort.
Fellmeth also demanded, or allowed, the adoption of a conser-
vationist point of view. As a result, rather surprisingly, Politics of
Land is a book primarily about rural California. Except for a rather
detailed chapter on land use planning in Santa Clara County,7 rela-
tively little of the book addresses problems in metropolitan areas one
would have expected to be covered. Virtually nothing is said about
urban renewal, subsidized housing, urban parks and beaches, and the
practices of real estate brokers, title insurance companies, mortgage
lenders, and large-scale homebuilders. Two chapters, in contrast, are
devoted to "wild areas"8 and by far the longest chapter is on agriculture.9
This rural slant indicates that the task force did not take many cues
from urban poverty lawyers, who were certainly potential sympathizers.
Rather, since the report aims tired salvos at already-bloodied environ-
mentalist targets like the Disney development in Mineral King, the Ir-
vine Company land swap in Upper Newport Bay, and the supersonic
airport at Palmdale in the Antelope Valley, the task force seems to
have used the files of the Sierra Club (which financed almost half the
task force's total cost of $18,500) as one of its major research sources.
The fervently environmentalist sections of the book are not only its
least original, but also its weakest, departing as they do from the hard-
headed cost-benefit approach that surfaces in other sections. Policymak-
ers should certainly consider in their cost-benefit analyses of individual
projects the impact on Sneezeweed at Mineral King,10 mud-flat inverte-
brates in Newport Bay11 and coyotes in the Antelope Valley.
12 Some of
those projects, particularly the Palmdale Airport in the Antelope Val-
ley, may well prove not to be cost-effective when their environmental
costs are considered; but to place an infinite value on not disrupting
those species so that no benefit can overcome it will, in the long run,
seriously discomfort man, the most numerous mammal in southern Cali-
fornia and one presumably entitled, like other species, to having its in-
terests weighed.
The environmentalist outlook of the report produces frequent
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selection" presents case studies of proposed roads in three virgin areas
-Coyote Canyon near Borrego Springs, Malibu Canyon, and Mineral
King. 3 One wonders why these routes were chosen, rather than other
equally controversial urban routes such as the Century and Beverly
Hills freeways. The rise of environmentalism as a successor to the
Civil Rights movement of the 1960's seems to have made concern
about the disruption of remote flora and fauna more in vogue than con-
cern about the massive uprooting of urban neighborhoods. A more
balanced selection of material would have strengthened the objectivity
of the report and broadened its appeal.
In addition, the task force report is simply not a careful piece of
work. As it turns out, Ralph Nader has not been appreciably more
successful in controlling the quality of the output of his raiders than the
president of Boise Cascade has been in controlling the sales practices
at that corporation's recreational subdivisions. The abilities of the task
force members obviously varied widely. Like many team efforts, Poli-
tics of Land makes uneven reading. The reader can move from a so-
ber and well-balanced discussion of forestry practices, 4 which acknow-
ledges that "[c]ategorical criticism of any and all clear-cutting, although
popular with emotional conservationists, is simplistic . . . "5 to a mind-
less chapter on highways.' 6 A dramatic example of unevenness is
presented by the two appendices on the economics of the State Water
Project that transports water from the Sacramento Delta to southern
California: one is competentlr and the other is hopelessly confused.18
Perhaps because of the size of the task force and its overly ambi-
tious mission, the errors come thicker and faster than in the average
Nader report. In just its first few pages, the report incorrectly states
that the federal government disposed of 5 million acres of California
land during the 1960's'O (30 times the correct figure)20 and presents
a table on government land ownership in California that is not only








20. The decline in federal holdings in California from 1960 to 1969 was 157,000
acres. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUs, STAnTSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
192 (1970); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ADSTRACT OF Tm UNrrED
STATES 183 (1961).
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source attributed.21 Errors like these appear with such frequency that
all but the most ideologically blinded readers must develop a sense of
unease about the reporfs reliability.
Even if Fellmeth and his editors arguably might be comparatively
blameless for substantive errors in the material submitted to them by
their field investigators, they certainly should have been able to prevent
internal inconsistencies in the book, especially since they had over a
year to edit it after the initial unabridged report was released to the
press. Yet the task force seems to have approached even editorial
functions cavalierly. The estimate of A. Allen Post, the state's Legis-
lative Analyst, of the impact of the State Water Project on the interest
rates at which the state borrows money is stated variously in the book
as 222 percent and 123 percent. The text incorrectly describes 640
acres as a "quarter section," 24 and then only eight pages later contradicts
itself and correctly identifies that amount of acreage as a full section.25
The report on the one hand criticizes the State Water Project as a waste-
ful venture that will bring unneeded water to southern California, 26 but
at a later stage opposes construction of Palmdale Airport in a location
very near to where the State Water Project aqueduct now passes, on the
ground that the "water simply isn't available" to support a population
boom in the Antelope Valley.27 Fellmeth & Co. cannot have it both
ways.
Both Nader and many of his volunteers apparently are less inter-
ested in careful research than in arousing public wrath. Nader's own
writing and speeches have always been more distinguished by their tone
of outrage than their devotion to the facts. Robert Felimeth has been
quoted as saying, "Now we're writing leading texts. . . . Maybe we're
too concerned about accuracy."2 s An editorial bias toward provoking
passion may win headlines in the short run, yet is clearly a strategic
mistake for an organization as visible as Mr. Nader's now is. The
mightiness of the pen ultimately depends on the truth and objectivity
of what is written. Many governmental institutions justly criticized
21. P. 5. A footnote states the source of Table lb to be the 1969 CALIFORNIA
SrrATISTICAL ABSTRACT; that volume contains none of the figures in the table.




26. See, e.g., p. 157.
27. P. 451.
28. McCARRY, supra note 4, at 195 (emphasis in original).
1974]
HeinOnline  -- 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 645 1973-1974
646 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:641
in the California report were able to discredit the task force's work
by showing its factual errors. The Director of the State Department
of Water Resources, William Gianelli, could correctly characterize
the report as "a mass of misinformation."29  Ellen Stern Harris, one
of southern California's most prominent conservationists, delivered
the coup de grace by criticizing the report's failure to acknowledge
progress that had been made on environmental problems.30 The Na-
der organization is still capable of effective muckraking, as shown
by the superb recent report on the Bureau of Reclamation. 1 Sloppy
reports like Politics of Land, however, have proven to be ineffective,
and probably lessen the impact of Nader's better efforts.
II. THE MEDIA REACTION TO THE REPORT
Mr. Nader should know from personal experience that the media
can make an irresponsible investigation backfire by arousing public
sympathy for those unjustly attacked. Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed 2
became a best-seller only after General Motors had made him into a
celebrity by admitting at a Senate hearing in 1966 that it had hired a
detective agency to investigate his private life.83  Nader instantly was
adopted as a darling of the press3 4 and his public image remained
virtually impeccable until 1970 when an intemperate attack on Sena-
tor Muskie's anti-pollution record in an associate's study 5 first caused
journalists to question his credibility."6 The release of the California
land report in summer, 1971, triggered a new theme of Nader's press
coverage-his fallibility-that he has since been unable to shake.
The California report caught the attention of the Wall Street Jour-
nal, the New York Times, and virtually all California newspapers. Ar-
ticles written just after its release primarily were devoted to summariz-
ing its contents. The overly ambitious scope of the project assured that
its message to the public would be diffuse. The task force had made
so many recommendations that even sympathetic journalists could do
little more than write short paragraphs on complex issues like tax ad-
ministration, the state water quality agency, and the Palmdale Airport.
29. L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1971, § B, at 6, col. 1.
30. Id.
31. R. BERxmAN & W. Viscusi, DAMMING THE WEST (1973) [hereinafter cited as
BERKMAN & Viscusi].
32. R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
33. MCARRY, supra note 4, at 11.
34. Id. at 110-14.
35. J. Esposrro, VANISHING Am (1970).
36. McCARY, supra note 4, at 199-203.
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Later articles devoted more and more space to how negatively govern-
ment officials had responded to the report, and began to point out its
inaccuracies and assert its lack of originality. The title of a Wall
Street Journal review--"Ralph Nader's Shoddy Product" shows the
general tenor of the later newspaper stories." Los Angeles Times cov-
erage, the most voluminous of all, became increasingly critical with
each succeeding article.8s Its editors reacted even more critically than
its reporters; headline writers uniformly stressed the negative qualities
of the report;39 unfavorable letters to the editor were selected for publi-
cation.40  Editorials in almost all California newspapers were damn-
ing.4
1
Nader, Fellmeth and associates have since mounted a counterat-
tack. Politics of Land contains two afterwords (one by a sympathizer,
Bob Kuttner, 4- and one by Fellmeth 43) that summarize and assess the
reaction of the press to the initial report. Kuttner and Fellmeth both
admit it contained minor errors, but advance a more conspiratorial ex-
planation for the hostility of the media reaction to what they consider
to be a solid piece of work. They observe that the owners of most of
the major newspapers in the state have large land holdings and thus a
major financial stake in many of the projects and policies the task force
criticized. The Los Angeles Times' parent conglomerate, for exam-
ple, is part owner of the Tejon Ranch, which will have 28,000 of its
acres irrigated by the State Water Project.44 Times reporters, however,
37. Immel, Ralph Nader's Shoddy Product, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1971, at
12, col. 4.
38. See L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1971, § I, at 1, col. 4; § B, at 6, col. 1; id. Aug.
26, 1971, § I, at 1, col. 1; § II, at 7, col. 1; id. Aug. 27, 1971, § I, at 28, col.
1; id. Sept. 3, 1971, § I, at 3, col. 1; id. § I, at 20, cols. 1, 7, 8.
39. See, e.g., Nader Team Accuses Brown, but Its Methods are Questioned, L.A.
Times, Aug. 26, 1971, § I, at 1, col. 1; Most of California Hit in Nader Report Wrap-
up, L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1971, § I, at 28, col. 1; The Raiders Look at Land Lobbyists:
No New Information, L.A. Times, Sept. 3, 1971, § I, at 20, col. 1.
40. Shortly after the release of the first section of the report, the Los Angeles
Times printed two letters, both critical of the task force. LA. Times, Aug. 26, 1971,
§ H, at 7, col. 1.
41. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 31, 1971; L.A. Herald-Examiner,
Aug. 30, 1971, § A, at 14, col. 1; Tulare Advance Register, Aug. 26, 1971, at 12,
col. 1; Sacramento Bee, Aug. 24, 1971; San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 24, 1971, at
26, col. 1.
42. Pp. 493-501.
43. Id. at 501-11.
44. The source of this figure is a June 18, 1971, letter to Keith Roberts, a task
force member, from William Gianelli, Director of the Department of Water Resources
(DWR); a copy of this letter was included in a DWR news release of Aug. 23, 1971.
1974]
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steadfastly insist they were wholly objective in assessing the report.46
An irony of the press reaction is that, despite its numerous errors,
the Nader team showed that it was capable of considerably better in-
vestigative reporting than most journalists. Press coverage of resource
politics in California is usually roughly as error-ridden as Politics of
Land,4 6 and, while rarely as shrill, is also rarely as ambitious in its in-
quiries. Newspaper articles on a public works project, for example, usu-
ally simply quote the sponsoring agency's assessment of the costs and
benefits of the project; the Nader group at least tried to look behind
those figures to see if they were accurate. In reporting the pained reac-
tions of state agencies to the Nader report, the press similarly made
little effort to see whether those reactions were justified or were primar-
ily diversionary tactics designed to confuse the public, as seems to have
been the case at least for the state Department of Water Resources.4"
Reporters at the Los Angeles Times who criticized the report later in
fact relied on parts of it to develop feature stories on such topics as tim-
ber practices and the Southern Pacific's land holdings.48
Nevertheless, the thrust of the press coverage of Politics of Land
seems to have been appropriate. Government ineptness and favoritism
are too widespread to be startling news. The major news story growing
out of the release of the Nader California report was that the nation's
number one muckraker was no longer reliable. Jess Unruh was
roughly on target in his widely reported assessment that the report was
"80% accurate. '49  In light of Nader's shining reputation at the time,
the shocking fact was not how high the percentage was, but rather how
low.
][G. A FEW COUNTERVAILING STRENGTHS
The task force report has two chief virtues. The first is its fundamen-
The task force report indicates that 168,531 acres of the Tejon Ranch are in areas
served by the State Water Project. P. 164.
45. Telephone interview with Philip Fradkin, Los Angeles Times reporter, July
3, 1973.
46. A lengthy Los Angeles Times article on the Southern Pacific's landholdings
in California contains two major errors in its first two sentences. The article claims
that the company owns 2 million acres in the state. This figure is approximately
correct for SP's nontransportation holdings but leaves out another 275,000 acres held
for transportation purposes. Telephone interview with Thomas Buckley, Public Rela-
tions Manager, Southern Pacific Co., June 25, 1973. The article then states that 2
million acres is "an area about the size of Maine." Maine has 10 times that area.
L.A. Times, Apr. 16, 1972, § C, at 1, col. 1.
47. See text at notes 138-42 infra.
48. Telephone interview, supra note 45.
49. Quoted in a San Fraqcisco Chronicle editorial, Aug. 31, 1971.
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tal perception that government is prone to being captured by private
interests. That Mr. Nader shares this perception sets him apart from
the mainstream of populist reform. The predominant reformist creed
in this century, one that flowered most notably during the New Deal,
holds that government regulation and enterprise should be extended
widely to tame perceived evils of private business practices. This creed
sees as presumptively beneficial any shift of power from the self-inter-
ested private sector to government officials, who are viewed as inher-
ently public-spirited. This New Deal world view has come under sharp
attack in recent decades from a growing and diverse body of scholars
including "Chicago School" economists and "new left" heroes like
Charles Reich and Gabriel Kolko. These revisionists assert that in
practice public regulatory efforts have usually served to augment, not
mitigate, the influence of powerful economic interests.
Ralph Nader has been solidly in this revisionist camp from the
outset. Nader's biographer asserts that "[t]he idea that government and
industry are handmaidens in conspiracy and corruption illuminates
almost every sentence he utters."5  Nader and his associates per-
ceive, only a bit too simplistically, that "American life. . . is based on
a straight trade-political power in return for business profits, and
vice versa."51 Nader's historic role is to be the man who popularized
the debunking of the world view of the New Deal by demonstrating in
agency after agency the accuracy of the revisionist perception of gov-
ernment.5
2
Politics of Land repeats the familiar theme. Nader asserts in the
introduction that "[t]he land interests in California, to a significant ex-
tent, have bought, intimidated, compromised, and supplied key offi-
cials in state and local government to the point where these interests
50. McCARRY, supra note 4, at 318.
51. Id. at 217. Nader seems to have consciously narrowed his enemies. He
rarely observes that noncorporate interests such as labor unions, career civil servants,
or the military also possess the potential for capturing government.
52. Nader apparently has not yet fathomed the impact of his own findings, as
he continues to propose ambitious new government programs. See text at notes
175-82 infra. For an impressive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Nader world view, see Lazarus & Ross, Rating Nader, NEw Yonx Rnvmw oF Booxs,
June 28, 1973, at 31 [hereinafter cited as Lazarus & Ross]. The most coherent pres-
entation of the Nader philosophy is Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Compe-
tition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Green & Nader], admirably critiqued in Winter, Economic Regulation vs. Competition:
Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82 YALE L.J. 890 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Winter].
1974]
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govern the governors.""5 Despite the inexcusable errors in the report,
Politics of Land makes a rather convincing case for the validity of this
major proposition. The alliance between powerful private interests and
government emerges in every chapter through countless examples: the
industry-dominated boards assigned to regulate timber practices5 4 and
water pollution controls;55 biases in property tax assessments;50 price
discrimination in water rates for the benefit of agricultural interests;1
7
favoritism in local zoning decisions; 8 and on and on. No major politi-
cal figures are immune from being co-opted. For example, although
Democrats have always been better known than Republicans for their
anti-business rhetoric, the task force observes that Governor Edmund
Brown pushed through the dubious State Water Project in 1959-60;5D
and President John Kennedy presided at the 1962 ground-breaking
for the Bureau of Reclamation's San Luis project, 60 a western San
Joaquin Valley irrigation program that draws a particularly scathing
blast from the task force. 61
The analytical power of the revisionist view of government is best
illustrated in the report's discussion of the Williamson Act,0 2 which en-
ables owners of agricultural land to achieve lower property tax assess-
ments by signing contracts restricting their land to agricultural use for
at least 10 years.63 This Act, promoted by its sponsors as a means of
preserving open space, might appear to be good legislation to someone
unbenefited by a revisionist outlook. Fellmeth was able to see the
Williamson Act for what it is---"a complicated system of tax evasion
for the state's large landowners." 4
53. P.ix.
54. After the release of the report much of the California Forest Practice Act,
Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 4521-618 (West 1972), was held unconstitutional on due process
grounds for delegating excessive lawmaking power to timber interests. Bayside Tim-
ber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971).
55. Pp. 23, 115-52, 234-35.
56. Pp. 165, 245, 356-66.
57. Pp. 54-60, 152-59.
58. Pp. 31-36, 351-405.
59. Pp. 615-19.
60. I H. RODGERS & A. NiCHOLS, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA, § 50, at 59 (1967).
61. Pp. 175-78.
62. Pp. 36-42, 570-84.
63. CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 51200-295 (West 1966).
64. P. 42. The book's assessment of the Act is irritatingly uneven. The author
of the agriculture chapter seems to like the Act since he is concerned about prevent-
ing the urbanization of prime agricultural land. (The reasons for this concern, pp. 29-
32, make virtually no economic sense.) Felimeth, himself a strong revisionist, appar-
ently opposes the Act. P. 510. He may have added the footnoted sentence during
the editing stage.
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The Nader world view does sometimes appear distorted. Politics
of Land too often succumbs to the popular mythology that the interest
of the "People" as an organic whole is distinct from the sum of the in-
terests of all individual persons. 65 Nader also seems compelled to in-
sist that things are getting worse. He has written elsewhere, for exam-
ple, about the "steady slippage in the quality of American life" and
our "spreading crises."'60  Politics of Land talks unsparingly about the
grip of corporate power on the state. This vision ignores the political
realities of the last few years, whose trend was visible at the time Pol-
itics of Land was written. Major public works projects everywhere are
being delayed or blocked by lawsuits; the "land interests" identified in
the Nader report were unable to block passage of the California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act of 1970,67 or the coastal initiative of 1972.8
Its blindness to the growing power of the environmentalist forces gives
the task force report an air of unreality. Because Nader and associates
presumably view environmentalists as guardians of the "public inter-
est," they probably felt they could ignore them on the premise that the
environmentalists would make laudable use of government power
once they gained it. Although the fundamental perception that gov-
ernment is a captive of private interests is a virtue of the report, a true
revisionist would at least be skeptical about whether the capture of
government by the environmental lobby would be a significant im-
provement over what had gone before.
The report's second virtue is its admirable bent toward empiri-
cism. Like most Nader reports, the book presents accounts of field in-
vestigations that add an earthy and up-to-the-minute flavor that is too
often absent from more scholarly works. The press was less than ac-
curate in stating that the report presented virtually no new material.
Besides rehashing familiar issues, Politics of Land contains a number of
studies that were passed on to the Nader group by non-task force mem-
bers. These include a computer survey of property tax assessments in
65. A table on p. 460, for example, contrasts the lobbying money spent by "land
interests" with comparable expenditures by "conservation" groups and "miscellaneous
people's groups." This sophomoric dichotomy between "black hats" and "white hats"
fails to recognize that those with "land interests" are also "people" and the conserva-
tionists themselves have their own narrower special interests. The task force is also
prone to referring to the "public interest" as if that phrase were not devoid of policy
content. See, e.g., pp. 354, 356.
66. Nader, Introduction to M. GREEN, J. FALLOWS & S.D. ZwxcK, WHO RUNs
CONGREss 2, 4 (1972).
67. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-174 (West Supp. 1973).
68. CAL. Pun. RES. CODE §§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1973) (California Coastal
Zone Conservation Commission initiative of 1972).
1974]
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San Diego and Alameda Counties (documenting the underassessment of
raw land);69 a county-by-county investigation by State Senator George
Danielson on landowner use of the provisions of the Williamson Act; 70
and an unreleased Attorney General's report by a controversial ex-
deputy attorney general, Marshal Mayer,7 1 that chronicles the develop-
ment of California City, a fantastic real estate project in the bleak desert
of the northern Antelope Valley. 2
The excerpts from this last report are one of the high spots of the
book. California City contains some 100,000 acres, making it the
third largest city in California in area. By 1968, after a decade of
selling, the developer had sold 32,000 parcels, only about 1 percent of
which had by then been improved with single family houses; many of
the few completed homes were occupied by the developer's employ-
ees. Despite a tendency toward sensationalism, the Attorney Gener-
al's report provides a fascinating glimpse at the financing, marketing
and development practices at desert subdivisions. Best of all, the re-
port contains data on the resale prices of lots in selected tracts at Cali-
fornia City.73 Roughly speaking, sellers in 1968 were able to recover the
lot price they had paid a decade earlier-an unimpressive showing for
California land during this period. Mayer's California City report is so
well researched and written, in fact, that -the rest of Politics of Land
pales beside it.
Besides reporting these outside studies, Fellmeth and his staff un-
dertook a few empirical ventures of their own. These turned out, un-
fortunately, to be more impressive in intention than in execution. The
task force conducted a poll of Santa Clara County residents to test
knowledge of the local political structure,74 surveyed land uses on the
coastline north of San Francisco, 75 and investigated the rate of 'con-
struction at Boise Cascade recreational developments.70
The task force's most ambitious project was to identify large
private land holdings in California. Obtaining accurate land owner-
69. Pp. 361-64.
70. The results of this survey are presented in a 15 page appendix. Pp. 570-
84.





76. P. 182. They report that almost no homes have been built outside Boise's
three most choice recreational locations. Id.
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ship information is exceptionally difficult because of the frequency of
land transfers and the use of subsidiaries, straws, and other masks
of ownership. The task force worked from a jumble of sources,
many of them outdated, to compile a 25-page list of major private
holdings in California.77  This state-wide list is almost certainly a
mass of individual inaccuracies, but on the whole probably roughly re-
flects the actual degree of ownership concentration. Other lists in the
report identify the alleged largest landowners in a dozen California
counties, most of them rural ones in the lightly populated northern part
of the state.78
As was well known before publication of the report, there are
some very large corporate land holdings in California. The Southern
Pacific Company, which admits to almost two and one-half million
acres, owns the most.79 Politics of Land places the Newhall Land and
Farming Company in second position with about a million and a half
acres. 80  Altogether, the 25 largest private landowners, mostly large
industrial corporations, are portrayed as holding over eight million
acres, or about one-sixth of the private acreage in California.81 The
degree of ownership concentration is of course higher in certain sub-
parts of the state. Sierra County has the greatest degree of concentra-
tion shown; there the five largest private owners possess slightly over
one-third of the private acreage8
Assuming these concentration figures are roughly accurate, what
can one make of them? The task force considers land ownership con-
centration in California "remarkably high' 8 3 and is concerned about it
because
a large landowner may be able to monopolize a particular market
because he has the power to set prices on the products of his
land; he may even be able to exercise control over an entire re-
gional economy.84
This is theoretically correct, but the facts presented in Politics of Land
77. Pp. 51540. See also pp. 10-11.
78. Pp. 13-15, 541-51.
79. See note 46 supra.
80. P. 10.
81. Id.
82. P. 544. Table on p. 13 incorrectly indicates that the four largest private
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fail to make even the beginning of a case for finding a land monopoly.
Development of a concentration ratio to gauge monopoly power
in a market for a resource or product requires a definition of the
relevant product line, determination of the geographical boundaries of
its market, and identification of a unit of measure for the market share
of each firm. The task force made questionable choices on all three
scores and thus exaggerated the case for finding monopoly power over
the state's rural lands.
First, the concentration ratios in the report are figured only on the
basis of private land holdings. This is a major distortion whether one
takes as the relevant product line either raw land or timber, oil, orange
trees or any other specialized product from land. Government (fed-
eral, state and local) owns roughly half the area of the state of Cali-
fornia, and regularly leases its lands for private use. The impressive
characteristic of land ownership in Sierra County, to use the report's
most "highly concentrated" jurisdiction, is not that the largest private
owner, Fibreboard Corporation, owns 12 percent of the total private
acreage, but that government owns 65 percent of the total land in the
county, or about 14 times more than Fibreboard. s5 On a state-wide
basis the U.S. Forest Service owns more acres of commercial forest than
all private owners put together.86 Government-leased land competes
with private land and should be included when calculating concentra-
tion ratios.
Second, county concentration ratios are a poor indicator of market
power because there are at least multi-county markets in most land
products. For example, the rural lands in the northernmost California
counties are primarily valuable for logging. Counties are too small
to contain economically separate markets for logs. Those markets
might even be defined as international; the United States exports
large quantities of logs to Japan. Furthermore, even if the state-wide
log market were selected for analysis, the task force reports that 20 firms
own about 43 percent of the state's private timberland 7 --a sufficient
number to impede monopoly pricing, especially in light of the Forest
Service's holding. 88
Third, using acreage as the unit of measurement for determining
85. P. 13.
86. CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 125 (1969).
87. P. 11. The source is not indicated, but was probably 1969 CALWoRNA STA-
TSTCAL ABSTRCT 125.
88. Monopoly power over the supply of redwood logs or other rare species is
HeinOnline  -- 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 654 1973-1974
BOOK REVIEWS
a firm's market share of land resources is like using square footage
of canvas to evaluate the quality of an art museum. For most pur-
poses land value is the relevant measure. The report's statistics on
ownership concentration by value are tucked away in an Appendix. 89
Not surprisingly, the data indicate that owners of large acreage tend to
own the dregs of California. The Southern Pacific owns 280 square
miles in Siskiyou County, for example, but those lands have an appraised
market value of only $14 million, no more than a good-sized downtown
office building.90 Rural Siskiyou County lands have an appraised mar-
ket value ranging only from $20 to $200 an acre.91 Undeveloped ur-
ban land in California is commonly valued hundreds, if not thousands,
of times higher than those figures.
In short, Politics of Land contains no figures on land ownership
concentration that are worth the serious attention of the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department. That 220 concerns own 35 per cent of
private California crop land is certainly persuasive evidence that cor-
porate agriculture has come of age.92 However, agriculture still has a
way to go, to put it mildly, before it approaches the concentration ratios
in the automobile, aircraft or aluminum industries.
Concentration of land ownership also has its positive side. The
authors are aware that there are good reasons not to break up large
landholdings that allow efficiencies of scale. They are willing to pro-
pose that California adopt Minnesota's 5,000 acre ceiling on corporate
ownership of farmland only because they doubt if there are significant
scale efficiencies above that size.9" Ceilings on holdings, however, will
cause inefficiency if further scale economies are available (as they
seem to be, well beyond 5,000 acres, for commercial forests, cattle
ranching, and a wide variety of agricultural uses).94 Politics of Land
itself observes that the checkerboard land ownership pattern that still
not an impossibility, but since redwood must compete with other woods and wood-
substitutes, that species may not be an economically distinct product line.
89. Pp. 552-55.
90. P. 554. See also asterisked note at p. 552.
91. P. 554. Raw land generally tends to be underappraised for property tax as-
sessments, and Politics of Land asserts that timber land in particular is systematically
undervalued. Pp. 203n, 365. The SP's holdings in Siskiyou County are still hardly
prime land.
92. P. 12. Consistent with the national trend, the average California farm in-
creased almost threefold in acreage from 1940 to 1969. P. 16.
93. P. 85.
94. Thirty-five percent of the cropland harvested in the United States in 1969
was in farms of 2,000 acres or more. U.S. BuREAu OF THm CENsus, STATsicTAL AB-
sTRAcT oF m Ur-ruD STATES 586 (1972).
19741
HeinOnline  -- 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 655 1973-1974
656 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:641
continues in some places from the railroad grants of the 19th century is
a "major stumbling block to sound forest management in California."
It notes U.S. Forest Service efforts to trade sections of land with the
private owners of the alternating checkerboard squares so that both can
consolidate their holdings into more useful chunks. 0 Historically, ceil-
ings on land ownership have usually been evaded through loopholes
and thus their main economic effect has been to impose wasteful ad-
ministrative costs on owners and regulators. These ceilings could pos-
sibly make sense only when monopoly land power can be shown, and
Politics of Land fails to demonstrate the existence of such power.
At some size, there may actually be disefficiencies of scale in land
ownership for some uses; if so, market forces will tend to break up pri-
vate land holdings. Southern Pacific's experience tends to support this
hypothesis. That railroad received a federal grant of 10 alternate sec-
tions on each side of the track, within limits of 20 miles, for every
mile of track it built.9 7 At maximum this equalled 12,800 acres per
mile of track. Southern Pacific originally acquired 6Y million acres
of California through these grants,9 8 but has since steadily reduced its
holdings and now has little more than one-third left.90 Moreover, ap-
parently because it perceives that it is too big to employ this land effi-
ciently within its internal organization, Southern Pacific leases much
of its non-transportation holdings to timber, petroleum, and agricul-
tural firms.
The task force report fails to emphasize an impediment to the
efficient allocation of California land that is presently far more serious
than private land monopoly. The federal government owns about 45
percent of the area of the state,100 20 times more than the Southern Pa-
cific Company. Much of this land should no doubt remain in the pub-
lie domain as wilderness preserves, recreational areas, military reser-
vations, and the like. It is surely optimistic, however, to believe that
the federal government can efficiently allocate its current vast holdings
through its internal decision-making processes. Any program to break
up large land holdings in California might well take the federal gov-
95. Id. at 259.
96. Id. at 259n.
97. S. DAGGETr, CHAPTERS ON THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC 50, 122
(1922).
98. P. 18.
99: See note 46 supra.
100. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
189 (1971).
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eminent as its first target.
In urban areas, contrary to the thrust of the task force, the concen-
tration of private land ownership should be encouraged, not deplored.
Politics of Land presents in its appendices complete data on only one
urban county, Sacramento.10 1 As one would expect given the value of
urban land, concentration ratios of land ownership are much lower in
urban areas than in rural ones. The four largest private landowners by
acreage in Sacramento County are reported to own together 7.6 percent
of the private land area of the county. Using the valuation of land
(excluding improvements) as the measure of market share, the four
largest owners hold 4.9 percent of the assessed land value in the
County.' 02 (Interestingly, none of the four top owners by assessed
land value are even in the top 20 owners by acreage.) These data
should dispel fears of significant monopoly power over land resources
in Sacramento. The more serious economic problem in urban areas is
usually that land ownership is too fragmented for optimally efficient
development. The consolidation of fragmented land parcels should be
facilitated, as it is, say, through the urban renewal process, to permit
development of facilities which have widespread external benefits that
can be internalized to their sponsor only if he owns a large surrounding
tract.'
0 3
IV. THE CALIFORNIA WATER PROJECT
The most controversial section of Politics of Land is its critique of the
State Water Project, a multi-billion dollar system that is now transport-
ing water from northern California to the dry southern regions of the
state.' 0 4 A review of the Project's history will be useful for illuminat-
ing the dynamics of public works planning, the failures of the Fellmeth
task force, and the nature of press coverage of complex public financial
arrangements.
The State Water Project is the raison d'etre of the California State
101. Pp. 550, 552-53.
102. The task force incorrectly states their share to be 2 percent, a considerably
lower figure. P. 552. They apparently used for the denominator of the calculations
the total assessed valuation in Sacramento County in 1968 ($1,207 million), a figure
that includes improvements and personal property, rather than the total raw land valu-
ation in the County ($387 million). See CAunionRIu STATiSTicAL ABsTRACT 193
(1969).
103. Aggregation of large urban parcels by private transactions is seriously hin-
dered by holdout problems and the need for vacation of public streets and easements.
104. Pp. 152-74; 600-26. For background on the Project, see generally C. MEYEs
& A. TARuocK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEmENT 345-64 (1971).
1974]
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Department of Water Resources (DWR). After a decade of planning,
the Project's construction was assured in 1960 by voter approval of a
$1.75 billion bond issue. The DWR then built the massive Oroville
Dam on the Feather River, a tributary of the Sacramento. The dam en-
ables DWR to pump water from the Sacramento Delta to the southern
part of the state along the west side of the San Joaquin Valley by
means of the Project's second major monument, the 300-mile long Cali-
fornia Aqueduct. The main branch of the Aqueduct runs to the
Tehachapi Mountains where the giant A. D. Edmonston pumping
plants'0 5 boost the water 2,000 feet up and over the Tehachapis, and
down to metropolitan Los Angeles. 10
The California Aqueduct will deliver at capacity about 4 million
acre-feet of water a year, an enormous volume approximately equal
to the total quantity now being consumed annually by all users in met-
ropolitan Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego. The DWR does
not sell water directly to consumers, but wholesales it to 31 local water
agencies in the middle and southern part of the state with whom it has
long-term supply contracts.' 07 The largest of these agencies is the Metro-
politan Water District of Southern California (MWD), a regional body
whose service area includes half the population of the state. The MWD
was formed in 1928 to build and operate the aqueduct from the Colo-
rado River to the Los Angeles basin. MWD has contracted to buy
an eventual 2 million acre-feet of water a year from DWR, or almost
one-half of the California Aqueduct's volume. To handle the northern
water, which is almost twice the volume carried by the Colorado
Aqueduct, MWD has embarked on a $1.3 billion construction pro-
gram that is now about one-half complete. 108
105. The energy needs of this facility are staggering. The DWR estimates the
Edmonston plant will consume about 2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity per year
during the 1970's and about 5 billion kilowatt-hours by the end of the century. DWR,
Bulletin No. 132-72, at 34 (1972). The total maximum annual energy requirements
for the State Water Project's 22 pumping plants is 13.5 billion kilowatt-hours, some
8 billion more than the power output of the Project. Id. at 180. For comparison, the
City of Los Angeles' Department of Water and Power sold about 17 billion kilowatt-
hours to ultimate consumers during fiscal 1972. Annual Report 1971-72 at 14.
106. Original plans for the State Water Project included a Peripheral Canal to by-
pass part of the Sacramento Delta, a drain to remove waste waters from the San Joa-
quin Valley, and a diversion of part of the flow of the Eel River across the coast
mountain ranges into the Sacramento River. Construction of these elements has been
postponed and some of them may never be completed.
107. These contracts usually run 50 years, a term sufficient to assure prospective
buyers of DWR bonds that the Department will have a continuing source of income.
108. MWD, Official Statement of Offering of $100 million Series D Waterworks
Bonds 37-44 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MWD].
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The MWD is itself a wholesaler of water for its 27 member agen-
cies, mostly cities and water districts. One of the MWD's members is
the City of Los Angeles' Department of Water and Power (DWP).
DWP has been buying about 10 percent of its water from the MWD,
obtaining the rest from local wells and two city-owned aqueducts to
the Owens River Valley located east of the Sierras. 0 9 Three sales
are thus necessary for residents of the City of Los Angeles to receive
State Water Project water: DWR to MWD; MWD to DWP; DWP to
consumer.
A complex public program like the State Water Project is best
evaluated by applying two criteria: efficiency and equity. Efficiency
can be assessed through cost-benefit analysis; equity, by tracing the dis-
tributional impacts of the Project-the windfalls it bestows and the
losses it imposes. The Nader critique of the Project basically follows
this format, although it frequently muddles the two criteria.
The State Water Project was a sitting duck for the Naderites un-
der both standards for evaluation. The prospective efficiency of the
project was at best doubtful when it was first approved in 1959-60. Al-
though there are considerable scale efficiencies in building large canals
and reservoirs,11° water agencies have historically tended to overbuild.
In one of the classic cost-benefit studies in all of economic literature,
Hirshleifer, DeHaven and Milliman concluded as long ago as 1960
that the State Water Project was vastly over-designed, and at minimum
should be postponed or built in stages.' Another eminent team of
economists, Bain, Caves and Margolis, reached the same conclusion in
1966.12 These critics pointed out that water has tended to be under-
priced, and that proper pricing would by itself greatly reduce future
water consumption. 1 3 They also deflated one of the main rationaliza-
tions for the Project-the prospective loss to Arizona of over one-half
of the MWD's entitlements to Colorado River water.114 Arizona and
109. DWP, Annual Report 1971-72, at 8.
110. J. BAIn, R. CAvES & J. MARGOLIS, NORTHERN CALiFORNA'S WATER INDUSTRY
210-23 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NORTHERN CALIFOR S'S WATER INDUSTRY].
111. J. HImsHLEiFER, J. DEHvEN & J. MELLn N, WATER SUPPLY 295-356 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as WATER SUPPLY].
112. NORTHERN CALFORNm'S WATER INDUSTRY, supra note 110, at 402-03, 561-
72, 719-29.
113. WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 109-11; NORTHERN CALIFORN'S WATER
INDUSTRY, supra note 110, at 360-61.
114. Widely predicted at the time of the 1960 vote on the Project's bond issue,
the loss of California water was confirmed in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963).
1974]
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the other claimants, they noted, were unlikely to make use of their full
entitlements to Colorado River water for many decades. More im-
portant, California's total entitlement to Colorado River water will al-
ways be at least 4.4 million acre-feet annually, or four times the capac-
ity of the present Colorado River Aqueduct that brings water to South-
ern California. California's senior entitlements to Colorado River
water are held by the Palo Verde, Imperial, Yuma, and Coachella irri-
gation districts, which use the water primarily to irrigate the Imperial
Valley. If Arizona ever exercises its claim to the water it has been
permitting MWD to take, the Colorado River Aqueduct needn't
drop to one-half use. To improve allocation of water within the state,
Hirshleifer, DeHaven and Milliman argued the MWD should then re-
place the water claimed by Arizona by either buying, or being author-
ized to condemn, the senior Imperial Valley entitlements and convert-
ing them to urban use.115 Through this example and others, these
economists contended that if more water were needed, there were alter-
native sources cheaper than bringing it down from the Sacramento Delta
and pumping it over the Tehachapis.
A combination of demographic, technological and political devel-
opments have made the State Water Project an even more vulnerable
target today than it was when Hirshleifer, Bain, and their associates
did their work. Since the time the Project was planned the national
birthrate has dropped precipitously and migration to California has
slowed to a trickle. In 1960 the DWR had projected, for example,
the 1990 population of Los Angeles County at 10.3 million, an increase
of 4.3 million over its 1960 population."' Los Angeles County plan-
ners now estimate the County's 1990 population at 7.7 million,"' an
increase from 1960 only 40% of that projected earlier by the DWR. In
addition, per capita water consumption has not gone up as much as
expected because of the increased incidence of apartment living in
Southern California."" Efforts by industry and local agencies to re-
claim sewage have become more widespread than was anticipated. 10
115. WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 320-22. See also id. at 227-29.
116. Charles T. Main, Inc., Interim Report [on the State Resources Development
System] 4-6 (1960).
117. L.A. Times, May 28, 1973, § I, at 24, col. 2. The new projection is based
on the U.S. Census Bureau's "E" projection of fertility which assumes each generation
will just manage to replace itself. Fertility is currently running at approximately that
rate.
118. MWD press release, Oct. 13, 1970, reported, e.g., in L.A. Times, Oct. 25,
1970, § C, at 3, col. 5.
119. Id.
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The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's Central Arizona Project, a pet bit of
pork-barrelling of the late Senator Hayden, has been substantially de-
layed and thus Arizona will not threaten the MWD's Colorado River
water source until 1983 at the earliest.12 The MWD now admits that,
if the Central Arizona Project is built, it will not lose as much Colorado
River water as expected if means can be found to augment that
river's flow.-2 Lastly, during the 1960's, the City of Los Angeles'
DWP, not satisfied by the prospect of expensive state project water,
built a second Los Angeles Owens River Aqueduct, thus considerably
increasing local water supplies in southern California.
As a result of this combination of developments, the DWR, and
its primary purchaser, the MWD, now must deal with a monumental
excess capacity in their water carrying facilities. The DWR's own
reports show a surplus of one million acre-feet of water in ur-
ban southern California in 1990.122 The MWT) oddly boasts that, "with
its new water supply from the State Water Project, the District can
meet increasing water demands until well into the next century.
'123
As will now be shown, if costs and benefits are discounted to present
values, these agencies have little to be proud of except their political
savvy in getting funding for projects decades before they could be self-
supporting.
From the start, public officials sponsoring the State Water Project
issued misleading statements about its costs and benefits. The DWR
released an analysis in 1960 that predicted $2.50 in benefits for every
dollar invested, and calculated total Project construction costs at $1.9
billion.1 24 The distortions necessary to reach these results included:
exclusion of provisions for working capital; exclusion of the $0.5 bil-
lion Oroville Dam from Project costs (although the Dam was a key
element and one of the first facilities constructed); failure to provide
an allowance for inflation of construction costs (a customary precau-
tion in public works planning); and additional miscellaneous errors all
generous to the Project' 25 The DWR's financial statements since 1960
120. MWD, Annual Report 1972, at xxix, 102. For a critical discussion of the
Central Arizona Project, concluding that it should not be built, See BERKMN & VIS-
cusI, supra note 31, at 105-30, 210.
121. MWD, supra note 108, at 29.
122. DWR, Bulletin No. 160-70, at 31 (1970).
123. MWD, Annual Report 1972, at xii.
124. DWR, Bulletin No. 78 (1960).
125. See generally Dillon, Read & Co. Inc., Interim Report [on Financial Aspects
of the State Water Project] (1960); WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 335-38; pp.
608-11.
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have additionally failed to include depreciation of plant and equipment
as an operating expense (contrary to the practice of both MWD and
DWP) and have consistently omitted the provision of adequate reserves
for replacements.
Actual Project construction costs, of course, have far exceeded the
$1.75 billion available from the 1960 bond act, and the DWR has been
incessantly scrambling for additional funds since 1960. By 1973, the
DWR had sold $345 million in bonds authorized in the 1930's for
the unbuilt Central Valley Project, sold revenue bonds secured by the
income of Project power plants, and, in its most controversial foray,
obtained a loan of $376 million from the state's tidelands revenues. 120
Despite these efforts and an expected $199 million in additional tide-
lands funds by 1980, the DWR estimates that it still has insufficient
capital funds to complete the construction program it plans for the
rest of the 19 7 0's.
12 7
In addition to underestimating costs, the agency has overestimated
benefits. Like most water agencies, the DWR projected future water
"requirements" in its 1960 cost-benefit analysis as if demand for
water were totally inelastic-that is, as if the amount demanded were
wholly unresponsive to changes in price. Since Project water is ex-
pensive to the consumer, this approach permitted an optimistic fore-
cast of revenues. The "requirements" approach is of course an eco-
nomic absurdity 2 ' because demand for both irrigation water and ur-
ban residential water is far from perfectly inelastic. 129
The DWR's most serious error was its choice of a low interest rate
for discounting future costs and revenues. Ambitious undertakings
like the State Water Project involve expenditures over several decades
and generate revenues and other benefits for a long period thereafter.
Because society values present consumption greater than an equal
amount of future consumption, these flows of costs and benefits must
be discounted to present value to be compared. If a 7 percent discount
rate is chosen, 2 dollars of project revenues in 10 years are needed to
counterbalance 1 dollar of current construction expenditures; if a 3
percent rate is chosen, only $1.34 in revenues would be necessary.
126. W. Gianelli, Report on Financial Status of the State Water Project in 1973
(presented to California Assembly Committee on Water, Feb. 20, 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Gianelli].
127. Id. The shortfall is $37 million.
128. See WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 347.
129. NoRTHERN CALFORNIA'S WATER INDUSTY, supra note 110, at 173-90.
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Public works planners therefore have a strong self-interest in applying
low discount rates, and historically have been apt to choose the current
borrowing rate of their own agency. Thus the DWR's cost-benefit an-
alysis of 1960 adopted a 3.5 percent discount rate,130 one somewhat
higher than the amazing 2.5 percent the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
was using at the time.' Virtually all economists agree that these
rates are far too low because public borrowing imposes opportunity
costs on private citizens by obviating alternative private investment.
Bain, Caves and Margolis suggest that public agencies use as a discount
rate "the marginal rate of time preference of the taxpayers or agency
constituents who ultimately finance the bulk of investment in water
projects,' '1 32 a rate they believe to be roughly equal to the marginal
rate of return on marginal long-term private investments (about 5-6
percent when they wrote in 1966, and at least 7-8 percent in 1973).
Hirshleifer, DeHaven and Milliman suggest a rate of 10 percent,
33
one currently applied by the Department of Defense for military con-
struction.
3 1
Application of these higher rates is of course devastating to the
State Water Project. Hirshleifer, DeHaven and Milliman concluded that
the costs of the Project would exceed its benefits even at a 2.7 percent
discount rate and that its inefficiency would prove awesome at a 10
percent rate.136 Bain, Caves and Margolis, applying 6 percent, calcu-
lated no better than 70 cents of benefits per dollar of costs.' 36
The slowdown in population growth and other unpredicted devel-
opments no doubt had made the benefit/cost ratio of the Project even
more unfavorable by the time Nader mobilized his California task force
in 1970. Regrettably, a revised cost-benefit analysis of the Project
proved to be beyond the capabilities of the Fellmeth team. Such an
analysis would have involved a determination of the flow of both the
costs and benefits of the project, and then a discounting of both those
flows to a selected date so that they could be compared. The task force
member assigned to calculate the cost of the State Water Project did not
understand the discounting process; to determine the total capital cost of
130. WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 342.
131. BERM xM & Viscusi, supra note 31, at 85, 229 (1973).
132. NORTHERN CALiFORNA'S WATER INDUSTRY, supra note 110, at 268.
133. WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 146-48.
134. BERKMAN & Viscusi, supra note 31, at 89.
135. WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 338-47, 351-56.
136. NORTmRN CALi ORRN_5'S WATER INrusTRY, supra note 110, at 569-72; 719-
29.
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the project, he simply added all interest payments due on Project bonds
through the year 2035, and thus "discovered" a hidden interest cost of
some $5 billion.1 7  Incredible as it may seem, Fellmeth and his fellow
editors never caught this error and it went through to publication in
Politics of Land.
Although the task force's critique of the State Water Project con-
tained many valid criticisms gleaned from the Hirshleifer and Bain
studies, this one colossal mistake effectively blunted its attack. The
DWR's director, William Gianelli, wisely pointed out this and other less
glaring task force errors in a press release responding to issuance of the
original report,8 s and thereby successfully turned the media's atten-
tion from the financial shortcomings of the Project to the failures of the
task force. The DWR also took this opportunity to disseminate addi-
tional misinformation about Project financing. The task force report
had asserted that construction monies provided from state tidelands
funds, perhaps ultimately as much as $1 billion, were going to be re-
paid without interest, and that this arrangement thus constituted a very
substantial taxpayer subsidy to the Project.8 9 The DWR press re-
lease contained a letter from Mr. Gianelli that tried to deny the exist-
ence of this subsidy:
Since all construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the project
which are allocated to the project water users are repaid with interest
by the project water users, the users are charged for repayment of princi-
pal plus interest with regard to tideland funds.
140
That the DWR is obligated to pay interest on the state's tidelands loan
would be interesting news to DWR's bondholders. The DWR's 1972
report on the State Water Project, written after the Nader charges,
clearly states that the tidelands funds are not required to be repaid with
interest,' 4 ' and contains financial projections that show a mere return
of principal after 20 years' interest-free use of the funds.' 2 The press
was apparently either unable to discover the DWR's misrepresenta-
tion, or was too busy discrediting the Nader report to find it worthy
137. Pp. 600-07, 159. Some Nader associates understand discounting, even some..
who served on the California task force. See pp. 609-10; BEiRMAN & VISCUSI, s1upra
note 31, at 83-89.
138. DWR, News Release, Aug. 23, 1971. See also L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1971,
§ B, at 6, col. 1.
139. Pp. 601, 158.
140. DWR, News Release, Aug. 23, 1971.
141. DWR, Bulletin 132-72, at 84 (1972).
142. Id. at 67-71.
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of mention. But the greater error was the task force's; its incompe-
tence had led to the garbling of one of its most important messages-
that Californians collectively were going to take massive losses on the
State Water Project.
The task force's inquiry into the distributional effects of the
Project was more competent that its efficiency analysis. Politics of
Land repeats the familiar but credible allegation that large land-
owners in the western San Joaquin Valley are the Project's major benefi-
ciaries.143  (It might have added that materials suppliers, building
trades unions and heavy building contractors would have an interest
in promoting a multi-billion dollar construction project.) How irriga-
tion water is priced determines whether agricultural landowners obtain
"windfalr' gains from an irrigation project . Most retail water agen-
cies sell water for agricultural use at rates much lower than for domes-
tic and municipal use. The Metropolitan Water District, for example,
currently sells water for agricultural use at roughly one-half the price
it charges for water for domestic use, and plans to reduce the fraction
to one-third over the next several decades; 4 the DWP's pricing policy
favors irrigators even more than MWD's.145 Some of this disparity in
price is justified because irrigation water need not be as pure as resi-
dential water and because its distribution network is usually less elab-
orate. However, these differences in the cost of supplying water could
justify only a small part of the price variation.
Price discrimination theoretically could be employed by a water
agency, like any other monopolist, to capture the "consumer surplus"
some buyers would obtain if the agency charged uniform prices. Agri-
cultural water prices seem to be too low, however, for that to be the en-
tire explanation for the price differential. If a water agency practiced
effective price discrimination, the value of agricultural lands would not
be significantly affected by the availability of water because a land-
owner's benefits from its supply would be largely offset by his liabili-
ties to the water agency in tap-in fees and unit water charges. If the
Nader task force is correct in reporting that isolated Kern County lo-
cations have risen over one hundred dollars an acre in value in antici-
pation of the availability of Project water,146 current price discounts to
agricultural users seem excessive and hard to justify. 47
143. Pp. 163-66; 619-23.
144. MWD, supra note 108, at 87.
145. DWP, Annual Report 1972, at 28-29.
146. P. 166.
147. As explained in text at note 149 infra, water agencies should be commended
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The losses imposed by the State Water Project will far outweigh
the windfall gains it bestows. Although the DWR tries to create the
impression that the costs of the Project will be paid for primarily by
water users, the Fellmeth team correctly charged that the Project is
blessed by substantial subsidies. All California taxpayers, for exam-
ple, suffer when the state foregoes possible income by making an inter-
est-free loan of tidelands funds to the Project. The largest subsidy is
provided by local property taxpayers in Central and Southern California.
The DWR has passed on most Project losses to the 31 water districts
that have contracted for Project water; those water districts in turn have
begun to pass on their deficits on Project water operations to their resi-
dents through property tax levies.
Water agency officials defend their use of property taxes to supple-
ment revenues from user fees on the ground that those taxes are a de-
vice for recapturing increases in land value that result from market rec-
ognition of improved water supply in an area. 118  Even if one ig-
nores the impact of the Williamson Act, this rationale is unpersuasive
because the most direct means for preventing speculative gains from
the availability of new water supplies is to impose higher rates on water
users, not to tax all real property regardless of its utility for water-in-
tensive activities. Property tax support of a water agency like the
MWD might be justified, however, to permit it to sell some water at its
marginal cost of providing it. Most economists favor marginal cost
pricing by public utilities whose fixed costs are sunk. That policy as-
sures optimal use of its existing facilities-that is, the right amount of
production, and the distribution of that entire production to con-
sumers.149 When a water agency's marginal cost of providing water is less
than its average cost, it needs an additional source of revenue, other than
unit water charges, to permit it to price at marginal cost. The MWD's
marginal cost of delivering additional Project water to Southern Califor-
nians during the next few years, for example, may be as low as $30 an
acre-foot, 150 and should probably be sold at that marginal cost to assure
for employing marginal cost pricing to allocate their water. If only agricultural water
rates are set to equal marginal costs, however, the agencies have the burden of explain-
ing why agricultural consumers alone are offered the lower prices.
148. J. Lauten, Comments on Nader Report, Aug. 31, 1971, at 12 (unpublished
memorandum by MWD's general counsel) [hereinafter cited as Lauten]; M. Holburt,
letter-to-the-editor, L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1971, § II, at 7, col. 1.
149. For a superb discussion of municipal water pricing, see WATER SUPPLY, supra
note 111, at 87-113. The task force's treatment of this topic is woefully simplistic.
See pp. 60, 165.
150. See notes 153 & 162 infra.
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proper allocation. The MWD's average cost will be many times that,
however, and it will suffer serious financial losses from these opera-
dons. Retail water agencies like DWP that are not tax-supported use
fixed monthly services charges on outlets to make up this deficit; a
wholesaler like the MWD, however, unless it can devise a system of
fixed periodic service charges against its 27 constitutent members,
must raise the balance of its revenues through taxation.
The MWD's future losses on its Project water operations can be
roughly estimated. Like other Project contractors, the MWD is obli-
gated, regardless of its water purchases, to make fixed payments to
the DWR over a 50-year period to cover its share of the DWR's con-
struction costs and fixed operating costs. The MWD's share of
capital costs exceeds that of all other contractors combined; it must
reimburse the DWR, for example, for over $1 billion of Project fa-
cilities south of the Sacramento Delta alone. 5' In 1972 the MWD
paid the DWR over $50 million to meet these fixed obligations, 5 ' al-
though it received only a trivial amount of Project water that year.
The DWR, following an efficient marginal cost pricing strategy, also
imposes two charges that vary with the quantity purchased by a con-
tractor. These consist of a unit charge for water at the Sacramento
Delta and a charge to cover the state's variable operating costs of deliv-
ering it. For the next decade or two these charges should total less
than $20 an acre-foot for MWD purchases at Castaic Lake. 5 3  Al-
though this marginal price is attractive to the MWD and should elicit
substantial purchases, the MWD's average purchase price for this
water is of course monumental because of its fixed contractual obliga-
tions.
The MWD has compounded its original mistake of contracting
for vast quantities of State Water Project water; it is now undertaking its
own $1.3 billion project to construct facilities for distributing it. Debt
service on the bonds financing MWD's own construction is projected
to range between $30 million to $55 million per year over the next
several decades.' 54 Since MWD is using internal funds to finance
about one-third of the cost of this construction,' 55 the opportunity cost
of those funds is also substantial. Table I provides a rough approxi-
151. DWR, Bulletin No. 132-72, at 150.
152. Id. at 154, 158.
153. Id. at 161, 170.
154. MWD, supra note 108, at 66-67.
155. Id. at 44.
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mation of the losses the MWD will incur on Project water operations
in selected years through 1990, the last year for which full data are
available. The Table is generous to the MWD because it uses DWR's
projections of operating costs that fail to provide for inflation,'50 as-
sumes that MWD will be able to sell its entire supply of Project water
at its domestic and municipal use rates, and selects MWD's borrowing
rate as the proper discount rate. Despite these rosy assumptions, the
MWD is shown to have been losing roughly $85 million a year for the
last few years because of its involvement with the Project, and is pro-
jected to continue sustaining comparable annual losses for the next
several decades.
TABLE I
AUTHOR'S APPROXIMATION OF MWD'S COSTS AND REVENUES FROM
PARTICIPATION IN THE STATE WATER PROJECT
($ in millions)






3. Total Delta Water
Charges' 59
4. Debt Service on bonds
Financing MWD's Construction' 00
5. Opportunity Cost of MWD's
Internal Construction Funds' 6 '
6. MVD's Variable Delivery Costs
at $10 per acre-foot' 62
7. Total Cost to MWD
8. MWD Domestic Water Sales
Price (in dollars per
acre-foot)163
9. MWD Revenues ($ millions)
(line 1 x line 8)
10. MWD Loss
(line 7 less line 9)
Even if these deficits are
1972 1973 1980
60,000 110,000 828,000 1,400,000
$ 52.7 $ 58.2 $ 66.3
$ 0.5 $ 1.0 $ 7.4
$ 22.4 $ 26.8 $ 37.4









$ 2.9 $ 5.7 $ 54.6
$ 84.5
eliminated
$ 94.8 $ 83.5 $ 75.4
thereafter, immediate costs
156. DWR, Bulletin No. 132-72, at 98.
157. Id. at 120-22.
158. Id. at 169.
159. Calculated by multiplying the quantities in line 1 of the Table by the appro.
priate Delta Water Charges presented in id. at 170.
160. MWD, supra note 108, at 66-67.
161. Calculated at 50 percent of line 4.
162. This is probably a conservative estimate. MWD incurred $23 million in to.
tal operating expenses in 1972 while delivering 1,250,000 acre-feet of water, or an aver-
age of almost $20 per acre-foot. MWD, Annual Report 1972, at 140.
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weigh more heavily than future benefits when one discounts to present
value. By conservative estimate, the MWD's involvement in the
State Water Project has a present worth to Southern Californians of
minus $0.5 to $1 billion.
Inefficient aqueducts are not a new problem for the MWD;
it had great difficulty selling Colorado River Aqueduct water for the
first 20 years of that system's operation. The MWD made up those
deficits by levying property taxes, the same strategy it is now pursuing
to cover its losses on its contract with the DWR. In 1972, the MWD
assessed a 17-cent tax on the $29 billion assessed valuation in its dis-
trict, thereby producing roughly $49 million in revenues,"1 4 an amount
almost sufficient to cover its fixed contractual obligations to DWR.
Contrary to the DWR's statements that the Project is self-supporting,
Southern Californians will probably be making up its deficits through
property taxes for much of the rest of this century.
MWD applies an essentially uniform property tax rate to the Dis-
trict's property owners. The rate for an area does not correlate signi-
ficantly with the amounts of MWD water purchased by that area's mem-
ber city or water district. Residents of the City of Los Angeles, for ex-
ample, paid MWD $220 in taxes in 1972 for every acre-foot of MWD
water consumed; residents of San Diego County contributed only 1/12
as much, $18 per acre-foot.'6 5 One way to deter a water wholesaling
agency like MWD from undertaking overly ambitious projects is to re-
quire it to raise the revenues it needs to carry on marginal cost pricing
only through annual service charges on its member agencies. These
charges could be keyed to the amount of their past and projected future
consumption of MWD water. This policy would have thrown more of the
costs of the California Aqueduct on San Diego and Orange counties and
might have discouraged property owners in those areas from supporting
the Project since they would have known they would be less able to shift
its losses onto non-users elsewhere in Southern California.
Most of the costs of the State Water Project are sunk and can no
longer be avoided. It is thus most unlikely that it would make eco-
nomic sense at this point to shut down the California Aqueduct.
Water agencies can maximize efficiency hereafter by evaluating the
164. MWD, Annual Report 1972, at 141.
165. Calculated from Tables 14 and 36, id. at 27, 152. MWD offers some water
to the City of Los Angeles at special agricultural rates. Lauten, supra note 148, at
19-20. This appears to be token conscience money, given to counter the seeming
inequities of MWD's tax structure.
1974]
HeinOnline  -- 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669 1973-1974
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:641
marginal costs and benefits of each incremental construction project
or operating program they might undertake. Southern California has
other relatively inexpensive sources of water available to it. Both wa-
ter agencies and industrial corporations, for example, are increasingly
experimenting with reclaiming waste water; the MWD could buy addi-
tional entitlements to Colorado River water to keep that Aqueduct at
maximum capacity. Marginal analysis might thus indicate that large
parts of the DWR's $398 million construction program for the rest of
the decade, 166 including perhaps the Peripheral Canal, are not cost-ef-
fective. The MWD has mercifully pushed back the construction
schedule of the $0.7 billion Foothill Feeder'6 ' and a new cost-benefit
analysis would likely warrant further postponements. The huge elec-
trical requirements for pumping water over the Tehachapis' 68 also
warrant reevaluation of the efficiency of continuing to install additional
pumping units at the A. D. Edmonston plant, especially since it now
seems those pumps will require construction of new nuclear power
plants in the southern San Joaquin Valley. In short, DWR should ne-
gotiate contract revisions with MVID and its other customers to prevent
the people of California from throwing good money after bad.
V. ANALYTICAL POVERTY LEADS TO PERVERSE
POLICY SUGGESTIONS
The authors of Politics of Land go beyond reporting; they suggest
specific policies for improving resource management in California-
stronger conflict of interest legislation;'6 9 decreased reliance on spe-
cial districts as governing units; 70 less property taxation of land im-
provements; 71 and the like. These policy suggestions often seem like
after-thoughts, are never well developed, and on balance appear likely
to make things worse. Mr. Nader and his associates have always
lacked an analytical framework for probing social problems that was
powerful enough to generate reliable policy prescriptions. Without an
analytical framework to discipline it, a team effort like Politics of
Land cannot escape ending up as a m6lange of environmentalist elich6s.
The editors of the book apparently tried unsuccessfully to impose
some sort of coherent analytic framework on the contributions of team
166. Gianelli, supra note 126, at 8.
167. MWD, supra 108, at 37-45.
168. See note 105 supra.
169. Pp. 486, 491-92.
170. Pp. 401-02.
171. Pp. 359-60.
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members. In his Foreword, Felimeth, a one-time Goldwater sup-
porter, 172 proposes guidelines for policy-making that even a Chicago
School economist would find acceptable:
We were guided by one major economic premise which is best
stated at the outset: Insofar as possible, those who benefit from
the expenditure of public monies should generally pay the cost
of providing that benefit and those who impose costs-whether
long-range, speculative, or indirect--on others, should bear those
costs. . . . Suggestions for reform seek correction through the
adjustment of self-regulating systems, so that they may properly
function, rather than through the imposition of additional layers
of bureaucracy dependent on the perpetuation of the problem they
were designed to solve.173
These principles constitute an excellent starting point. The text of Pol-
itics of Land, however, only occasionally reflects devotion to them.
The task force did try to develop a system of "zoning up" fees to
internalize the external benefits of installation of utility lines.17 4  This
effort was only half-hearted and its presentation is confused. In most
chapters of the report, the task force abandoned the search for self-
regulating mechanisms, and retreated to the shopworn notion of com-
prehensive master planning. Thus the transportation chapter pro-
poses creation of "a single comprehensive Transportation Agency,
which would coordinate and regulate air, rail, water and road trans-
portation."' 75  The agriculture chapter suggests that state ownership
of all California water rights would be preferable to the current "maze
of private water holdings,' 1 76 and implicitly endorses state acquisition
of valuable agricultural lands for lease back to private farmers.,7 7 Es-
tablishment of a statewide comprehensive land planning agency is en-
dorsed recurrently.' 78
Suggestions like these give Politics of Land the schizophrenic
character that several reviewers have discerned in Nader publications. 79
Although their exposes have documented as well as anyone's the ten-
dency of regulatory agencies to become handmaidens of narrow private
172. McCARRY, supra note 4, at 184.





178. Pp. 42, 289-90, 401-03.
179. See, e.g., Lazarus & Ross, supra note 52; Winter, supra note 52.
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interests, Nader & Associates continue to propose centralized govern-
mental solutions to social problems. Politics of Land describes the fu-
tility of comprehensive planning in the City of San Jose. 80 If land
planning proved to be an exercise in frustration at the local level, why
should the task force think that it would operate any better state-
wide? Government may tend in fact to be more efficient the more local
it is. The water agencies discussed in this review, for example, can be
ranked in the following rough hierarchy of inefficiency: the U.S. Bu-
reau of Reclamation is the most wasteful;"8' the state DWR and re-
gional MWD perform slightly less profligately; and the least inefficient
agencies are the local water retailers like DWP. This hierarchy sug-
gests that the most efficient strategy for providing water supply is to
allow local agencies to make incremental efforts to develop new sources,
rather than to establish a state-wide agency to project the "require-
ments" for California water over the next half century and to plot out
a massive system like the State Water Project for meeting all those
requirements.1
8 2
Self-regulating, market-oriented mechanisms for dealing with social
problems are more subtle than splashy new centralized government
agencies. These mechanisms involve such devices as cash, not cate-
gorical, government aids to individuals and other governments; regu-
latory techniques that permit regulated parties to choose among differ-
ent ways of carrying out their activities; institutional mechanisms (ana-
logous to bankruptcy) for ousting public officials who make consistent
mistakes in resource management; and the like. Development of these
mechanisms requires harder thinking than this particular Nader team
was willing to exert. Politics of Land demonstrates throughout the vis-
sicitudes of centralized planning, but asks us to try more of it.
180. Pp. 378-80, 383-89.
181. See generally BERXMA & Viscusi, supra note 31.
182. Cf. WATER SUPPLY, supra note 111, at 296-97.
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IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. By Raoul Berger.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. 345
(hard cover). $14.95.
REVIEWED BY JEFFERSON B. FORDHAMt
Raoul Berger, in his new book concerned with the constitutional as-
pects of impeachment at the national level in the country,' has shared
the fruits of his study at an extraordinarily relevant time in American
experience. His book is an impressive scholarly product that does
particular credit to the craft of the legal historian. There can be no
doubt that historical perspective is of uncommon significance for con-
stitutional interpretation on the subject of impeachment. In federal
constitutional interpretation the Supreme Court has held the tribunal
to be relatively free, as we all know, to resort to "legislative his-
tory." Actually this involves, as to the original document, not only
the proceedings of the 1787 Convention but also those of the state rati-
fying conventions. The author here has been diligent in resorting to
both sources. As an historian he has explored, of course, tertiary
sources, such as post hoc observations of members of the 1787 Con-
vention.2
In an overview, one must add that there remain distinctly more
questions than answers. This Review will focus on some of the major
issues treated in Mr. Berger's book and offer brief commentary on his
positions. All pertinent federal constitutional provisions are repro-
duced in a footnote in aid of ready reference.3
t Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law; Dean and Professor
Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Law School. J.D. 1929, University of North
Carolina; J.S.D. 1930, Yale University.
1. R. BERGER, IMPEAcHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS [hereinafter
cited to page number only].
2. There is, of course, question as to what authority an interpreter of the Con-
stitution is warranted in giving such tertiary expressions. There is precedent for such
consideration as in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), where such evidence was
considered in holding that the article I, section 2, provision for election of members
of the House by the "people" of the states demanded one person/one vote representa-
tion.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5: "The House . . . shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment."
HeinOnline  -- 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 673 1973-1974
674 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:673
I. OFFICERS SUBJECT TO IMPEACHMENT
The President, Vice-President and all civil officers of the United States
are impeachable. Does the "civil officer" class include members of
the Congress? In 1797, in the case of Senator William Blount, the
Senate set a precedent against impeachability of a member of Congress
that Mr. Berger challenges. This has a rather academic ring, especially
since each house has the expressly granted authority to expel a mem-
ber. One might speculate about the availability of judicial review of an
act of expulsion, in the light of the decision in Powell v. McCormack
4
as to exclusion, but that, too, is not on a front burner.
It is only fair to say that the Berger position is supported, as he
notes, by English experience, and that a case can be made for inter-
preting "civil officers" to apply to members of Congress as well as to
judges.
In contrast with the posture of legislative representatives, there is
no doubt that federal judges are civil officers subject to impeachment,
if practical interpretation means anything.. Mr. Berger's plaint is that
in the United States impeachment has been a process used largely as
a means for the ouster of corrupt judges. One might essay to draw a
distinction between judges of constitutional courts and so-called statu-
tory courts, in this respect, but how it could be effectively rationalized
is not evident.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, paras. 6-7:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affiimation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to re-
moval from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punish-
ment, according to Law.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 1: 'Ihe President ... shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Im-
peachment."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, para. 3: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; . .. ."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1: "In case of the removal of the President from
office, or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President."
4. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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What officers in the executive branch are impeachable? Clearly
those of cabinet level and those of ambassadorial rank in the diplo-
matic service are covered. How far beyond this impeachability
reaches, the Berger study does not trouble to explore. Perhaps this is
just as well, even though impeachment would appear to cover high
level personnel in the subcabinet category and perhaps some below
who had a substantial measure of authority and discretion. But the
inquiry is not of practical moment. Here, as was decided in United
States v. Myers,5 the executive power to appoint carries with it the
power to remove. Would a responsible President be likely to retain
in a cabinet post one whose conduct was highly suspect and who was
persona non grata to the Congress?
The top level officers in an independent agency occupy a differ-
ent stance. As to them Congress may provide for appointment for a
fixed term subject to removal only for cause and may determine the
procedure for such removal."
U1. CAUSE--GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT
The stated grounds for impeachment are "treason, bribery or other
high crimes and misdemeanors." There is one part of this branch of
the larger subject, which, despite the scholarship of the learned au-
thor, deserves but short shrift. We are told that in the light of English
practice, "high crimes and misdemeanors" refer to great offenses in
presidential impeachment, but that those terms embrace lesser offenses
in impeachment of judges. As the book concedes, this presents diffi-
culties. Whatever the English experience drawn upon by the framers
may have been, the constitutional language plainly does not differen-
tiate between impeachable officers in this respect.
A central issue discussed by Mr. Berger is whether the grounds
for impeachment comprehend conduct that is not an offense punish-
able under the criminal law. The Constitution, indisputably, uses the
language of the criminal law and process in its treatment of im-
peachment. For example, it excepts impeachments from the pardon-
ing power. Mr. Berger takes note of all this, but, in light of English
history, what went on at the 1787 Convention, and congressional in-
terpretation in actual cases, he has achieved the confident judgment
5. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
6. Humphrey's Executor (Rathbun) v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
This case did not involve a procedural challenge. The conclusion offered in the text
proceeds from a premise that "cause" is not meaningful without fair process.
1974]
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that the legal grounds for impeachment are not confined to indictable
crimes. More particularly, he explains the pardon power clause as an
instance of superabundant caution by the framers. While one may
question this, since it is criminal offenses to which pardons relate,
it should be added, at once, that the author is not suggesting that there
are no limits. He rejects out of hand the position taken by Congress-
man Gerald Ford a few years ago in relation to the case of a Supreme
Court Justice, that an impeachable offense is whatever the House and
Senate consider it to be. The Ford view is utterly political; it denies
the rule of law in impeachment proceedings.
Mr. Berger makes an impressive historical case, supported by the
fruits of his research in English experience, that "high crimes and mis-
demeanors" are words of art denoting a category of political (i.e., not
necessarily indictable) crimes that the founding fathers doubtless well
understood to be such. He identifies treason and bribery as clearly
political crimes and easily accords "high crimes and misdemeanors"
a like characterization by association through resort to the canon, nos-
citur a sociis. This is curious reasoning. Whatever the English im-
peachment background, treason is defined as a crime by the Constitu-
tion in the judicial article with the element of sanction left to the Con-
gress. The definition appears to be intended for all purposes, includ-
ing impeachment. Thus, the reference to "other" high crimes and mis-
demeanors in the impeachment provision seems to associate them with
treason as in the criminal category. It may be suggested that a pro-
scribed act can be both a political crime and a crime in the general
criminal law sense.
Since there is no federal common law of crimes, the only offenses
against the United States are those defined by statute. This was set-
tied by the Supreme Court in 1812. 7  Thus, if only punishable of-
fenses were grounds for impeachment, there could have been no such
actual grounds until Congress enacted some criminal law. What we
are told is that this was a later development not anticipatable by the
men in the Convention. It must be recalled, however, that there were
those who in the 1780's thought that there was a common criminal
law of the United States. Perhaps leading figures in the Convention
anticipated that there would be. An influential delegate to the North
Carolina ratifying Convention, James Iredell, a number of whose ob-
servations as such are prominently noted by Mr. Berger, took the posi-
7. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). Treason
is the one exception; it is defined by the Constitution.
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tion later as a Supreme Court Justice riding the circuit that violation
of neutrality was a common law crime punishable in the federal
courts. 8
The limited congressional precedents support the Berger view that
impeachment is not confined to punishable offenses. This is not to be
taken lightly. On the other hand, even if impeachment judgments are
not reviewable by the courts, as I shall suggest is the case, the Senate
might depart from the precedents. Such departures are not uncom-
mon in the judicial sphere.'
The book does not neglect the policy element. What is the thrust
of impeachment under the Constitution? The objective is to get an
individual as to whom grounds for impeachment exist out of office
and to disqualify him from further officeholding. That is exactly the
effect of a conviction by the Senate.
State experience with impeachment since 1789 is not taken into
account in the Berger study. It is of interest that while the federal
model has influenced the states, they have not been slavish in tracking
it. The Missouri provision, for example, includes misconduct, ha-
bitual drunkenness and incompetency in the grounds for impeach-
ment. 10 The object is riddance and the grounds are not confined to
criminal offenses.
What Mr. Berger contends is that since only lesser judges were
held to criminal accountability under English practice, leaving high court
judges to be acted upon by impeachment, the framers might well have
concluded that indictability was not the test of impeachment of high
court justices. This leads him to argue that surely the framers would
not have exacted a more severe standard of impeachment for district
court judges than for supreme court justices. But this can be turned
around; the framers might have been choosing the more stringent test
for both.
It is a Berger thesis that impeachment proceedings are not crim-
inal in character. His principal reliance here is upon the incompat-
ability of the impeachment process with the criminal procedure safe-
8. II G.J. McRE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 410, 416
(1858). There remains the debated question whether a stat6 crime may be a ground
for impeachment.
9. A conspicuous example is Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S..(16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
10. Mo. CoNsr. art. VII, § 1.
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guards of the Bill of Rights. What, for example, of the fifth amend-
ment right to grand jury action in relation to an infamous crime, or the
privilege against self-incrimination or the ban upon double jeopardy?
The point, of course, is that it is incongruous to apply at least some of
these safeguards to the impeachment process. This is true of double
jeopardy by force of the express language of the basic impeachment
clause.
It may be suggested that two other approaches to the applicability
of the Bill of Rights are open. The first is to regard impeachment as
something of a unique character-a device unto itself-to which the
Bill of Rights was not intended to apply. An intermediate approach
is to apply Bill of Rights safeguards to impeachment to the extent com-
patible with the nature of the impeachment process. Thus, the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination should apply for it obviously bears upon
subsequent criminal proceedings. The presence of the right to coun-
sel is equally free from doubt.
We come, perhaps belatedly, to the question: why have provi-
sions for impeachment? The framers were sophisticated political
thinkers who both saw the need for checks and balances and partic-
ularly feared abuse of executive authority. They were not embracing
parliamentary government. The chief executive was to be elected for
a fixed term of office. There was occasion for a strong safeguard
against excesses in his uses of power and serious neglect of duty. Thus,
as perceived by Mr. Berger, they found in the English conception of
high crimes and misdemeanors enough play to cover serious, albeit not
indictable, abuses of authority and neglect of duty.
Authority can be abused either directly or through subordinates.
The book quotes Madison as saying in the Virginia ratification con-
vention that "if the President be connected in any suspicious manner
with any person, and there be grounds to believe that he will shelter
him" he may be impeached. 1
Does impeachment lie for conduct outside of office? Suppose a
Vice-President were to engage in conduct out of office that was clearly
treasonable. The Constitution refers simply to treason; it does not
except activity unrelated to office. Suppose a cabinet officer used his
influence to. get a corporation to make an illegal political contribution
to the national treasury of the former's political party. That would
be an abuse of his position and would bear upon his fitness as a mat-
11. P. 89.
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ter of character and respect for federal law. In both cases, under the
Berger view, the conduct would be impeachable.
III. REMOVAL OF JUDGES
There is the familiar contention that, since federal judges hold their
offices during good behavior and since the Constitution makes express
provision for no method other than impeachment for removal of
judges, "misbehavior" should be considered a ground for impeach-
ment. The basic impeachment provision lends no support to this;
it makes no distinction, as to grounds for impeachment, between classes
of offices covered. If this be the case, how may a judge whose be-
havior as such is less than good be removed? The Berger answer is
that there is constitutional basis for a judicial process of removal. And
he devotes the longest chapter of the book to judicial "good behavior."
While the author draws upon English experience in resort to scire
facias to effect removal of minor judges at least, he rests his case upon
his conception of the constitutional design. If judicial tenure is made
by the Constitution to depend upon good behavior, there must be
means of termination of service upon the happening of the condition
subsequent, that is, bad conduct or misbehavior. All that it would
take, he suggests, would be congressional action based upon the nec-
essary and proper clause. The impeachment clause is not expressly
exclusive and surely we are not to allow a mere canon of interpreta-
tion, like expressio unius, exclusio alterius est, control so important a
matter.
Interestingly, impeachment is identified in the first sentence of the
book as a process which, in America, is largely a means for the ouster
of corrupt judges. If there has been power in Congress all along to
avoid or greatly reduce this burden by providing another method of
removal, why has such action never been taken? The Berger answer
is that it is never too late to see the light and heed the voice of reason.
Certainly, Congress could give it a try and leave all of us to look to the
Supreme Court for the last word.
In treating of the removal of judges, Berger does not lay much
store by reasoning which explains the presidential power of removal as
something derived by implication from the power to appoint. He
fails to note why the situation of appointive judges is not parallel to
appointees in the executive branch. The judges are members of a
distinct branch of the government, whereas appointees in the executive
1974]
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branch are there to work under the chief executive in getting done the
job for which he has overall responsibility.
One wonders why the author does not resort to the rules of the
House and Senate as a responsible interpretation of the constitutional
provisions on impeachment. That they are to be accorded some
weight is beyond serious challenge. In connection with his proposal
for statutory provision for judicial removal of judges, he raises a serious
question as to the constitutionality of the proposal by Preble Stolz for
congressional streamlining of the impeachment process. Professor
Stolz calls, in part, for use of a master or masters to conduct formal
evidentiary hearings for the Senate and submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law.'" Mr. Berger doubts that the hearing
function could be delegated constitutionally. He does not refer to the
fact that in 1936 the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate
When Sitting on Impeachment Trials were so amended as to provide
for a committee of twelve senators to receive evidence and take testi-
mony with full Senate powers for the purpose.'"
As a further word anent federal judges, one agrees with Professor
Kurland that attention should be given to the operative judicial selec-
tion process in which, particularly as to district judges, individual sen-
ators play such an at once central and extra-constitutional role."
Somehow we should have done with this aspect of Senate clubbiness,
a system that subordinates independent merit appointment to partisan
politics.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Berger thesis that an impeachment judgment is subject to appel-
late review by the Supreme Court is, to say the least, astonishing. He
relies heavily upon the case of Powell v. McCormack,5 which in-
volved judicial review of House action in refusing to seat one elected
to that body. He does not refer to the fact that in the Powell case col-
lateral attack was launched at the district court level nor to the fact
that the Court recognized that it could act only as against employees of
the House-not on members-in view of the barrier of the speech or
debate clause. Is it to be said that the Court could act on the Senate
as a body? In the case of an impeachment judgment against a Presi-
12. Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L.
REv. 659, 667 (1969).
13. SENATE MANUAL, SEN. Doc. No. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 110 (1973).
14. See Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some
Notes from History, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 665, 666 (1969).
15. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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dent, would the Chief Justice preside over the Court on review, as
well as in the Senate trial? Arguably, a federal court might entertain
a collateral attack upon an impeachment judgment on the ground that
the Senate had exceeded its jurisdiction by acting on the basis of a
charge or ground that was neither treason nor bribery nor other high
crime or misdemeanor. This position is supported by the opinion in a
Texas case, in which it was said that the courts may determine, in a
proper case, whether the state senate had acted outside its constitu-
tional authority in an impeachment trial. 6
The trouble with allowing such collateral attack is that the Senate
sits as a court with "sole" jurisdiction in impeachment and, as such,
can be said to have power to make authoritative determinations of juris-
dictional issues just as the Supreme Court does in the federal court
sphere. The judicial power extends to federal questions and diversity
of citizenship cases in law or equity. Would direct review of an im-
peachment judgment be such?
'Nor does Mr. Berger take account of congressional authority to
regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the high court. The judicial code
makes no provision for appellate review of an impeachment judgment.
Is it to be said that the Court could do so sua sponte? What process
could be used to get the Senate record before the Court for review?
Certiorari? Is the Senate to be viewed as an inferior court?
The author's concern about political influences in the Senate elic-
its sympathy, but there is no obviating the political element in a legis-
lative trial, as his accounts of the Chase and Johnson impeachments
bring out forcefully. As he has noted with respect to the Johnson im-
peachment, not even the Chief Justice as presiding functionary can
control the political forces. What chance is there in this country today
of truly keeping partisan attitudes and influences in check in an im-
peachment trial? This is not to say that there should be no resort to
impeachment.
The study does not deal with the question whether judgment of
16. Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 Tex. 85, 263 S.W. 888 (1924). This case involved
the political fortunes of Ma and Pa Ferguson, who, in their day, were much in the
national news.
In State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 63, 256 N.W. 377 (1934), which in-
volved impeachment of William Langer, another nationally known person, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota granted quo warranto, at the behest of the lieutenant governor,
ousting Governor Langer from office on the ground of "disability" brought about by
Langer's conviction of a federal felony. In doing this, of course, it first determined
that the question of disability was justiciable.
1974]
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impeachment must occur before a civil officer could be charged, tried
and convicted under the criminal law on the same matter. The objec-
tion was not pursued in the recent income tax evasion case against
Mr. Agnew for the obvious reason that he had resigned from the vice-
presidential office. Certainly there is no express determination of a
controlling order. In the case of the President, involvement as a de-
fendant in a criminal trial and the application of punitive sanctions
-notably imprisonment-would be incompatible with the perform-
ance of his duties. There is no provision for suspension from office
during impeachment proceedings. 17 Conceivably, the disability pro-
visions of the twenty-fifth amendment could be said to apply.' s There
would be no comparable incompatibility as to performance of the func-
tions of other civil officers covered by the impeachment clause. Fed-
eral judges have been tried in the criminal courts without being sub-
jected to impeachment proceedings in the first instance.' It could be
said again that the function of impeachment is removal from office and
disqualification for further federal officeholding and, thus, that the
constitutional clause as to subsequent criminal prosecution was de-
signed simply to make it clear that criminal liability was not barred by
an impeachment conviction.
It is an interesting if hardly fruitful speculation as to whether the
overhang or potential of impeachment has been an influence of any
substance upon official conduct. This observer regards the matter
with a welter of skepticism so far as the influencing of rectitude and
fidelity to duty are concerned.
There remains the function of impeachment to get a bad "un" out.
This Review is not an appropriate vehicle for expressing personal views
about resort to impeachment of the incumbent President. But it can
be said in general terms at this time that the House has a responsibility
to make thorough inquiry and, if it finds probable cause to exist, to
proceed with exhibiting articles of impeachment to the Senate. The
possibility-perhaps probability-that impeachment proceedings would
be protracted and highly political should not be a deterrent.
17. Some state constitutions do ordain suspension. E.g., UTAH CONST. art. VI,
§ 20.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
19. At p. 168 Mr. Berger refers to a district judge case in Pennsylvania in the
1930's. He reports that the judge was acquitted and later resigned when impeachment
threatened. Recently a court of appeals judge, Otto Kerner, was convicted in federal
court without any prior impeachment proceedings. United States v. Isaacs & Kerner,
No. 71 C.R. 1086 (N.D. Ill. 1973), ajI'd, at App. No. 73-1409, -1410 (7th Cir., Feb.
19, 1974). It is the reviewer's apprehension that the immediate point was not raised.
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SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Walter Barnett. Al-
buquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973. Pp. 333
(hard cover). $10.00.
REVIEWED BY D. J. WEST'f
A book which analyses the unsatisfactory state of American law
on homosexuality is to be welcomed. It is noteworthy that the author
uses the title sexual freedom rather than homosexual freedom, when
the latter seems to be his main theme.
Two important chapters are devoted to a review of the state of
scientific knowledge about the causes of a homosexual orientation and
the prospects of modifying it with the aid of medical and psycholog-
ical techniques. The moral drawn from this survey is that homo-
sexuals cannot be held personally responsible for their sexual inclina-
tions, that for many of them the prospects of change by means of any
known treatment are remote, and that the community could well af-
ford to allow them to enjoy the love life they need without harassment
from the criminal justice system. These sentiments, which are heartily
endorsed by the present reviewer, would seem to point toward the
desirability ot a policy of decriminalisation, such as was implemented
in England and Wales by the Sexual Offences Act of 1967,1 which ex-
empted consensual homosexual behaviour between two adults in pri-
vate from any criminal action. Despite a long standing recommenda-
tion of similar legislation by the American Law Institute,2 Profes-
sor Barnett is skeptical of the likelihood of its adoption in many states
of the Union, since public opinion is generally thought to be antagonis-
tic toward such reform. So far only seven states have enacted the
necessary legislation, and this was done only through technical revi-
sions of the criminal codes by legal experts without much political
discussion and without reference to the voters.
Whether this pessimism about the prospects for meaningful legal
t- Reader in Clinical Criminology, University of Cambridge. M.D. 1958, Uni-
versity of Liverpool; Ph.D. 1967, University of Cambridge.
1. Sexual Offences Act of 1967, c.60.
2. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment at 277-79 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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reform is fully justified is open to question. Anyone who studied the
diatribes against homosexuals in the parliamentary debates and in
the English popular newspapers, at the time the Wolfenden Commit-
tee3 first made the proposal to liberalise the anti-homosexual laws,
might be forgiven for supposing that public intolerance would never
permit such a change. Yet 13 years later it happened. Moreover,
the legal change produced none of the dire consequences foretold
by the opponents of reform. Apart from the brassy propaganda of a
small minority of "gay" activists, there has been no homosexual revolu-
tion, and according to the criminal statistics no increase in the incidence
of the homosexual offences that remain (namely importuning, public
indecency, and misconduct involving young persons). Furthermore,
there has also been no sign of any substantial puritanical backlash
against homosexuals. The mass media have become conspicuously
better informed and less unsympathetic in their references to the homo-
sexual minority. Serious biographers, playwrights and novelists have
tended to give franker and more understanding accounts of the homo-
sexual as well as the heterosexual aspects of life. Among civilised
Englishmen, the paranoid attitudes toward homosexuals so prevalent a
few decades ago are no longer fashionable. The old anti-homosexual
criminal code, so widely accepted a short time ago, is now seen to be
absurdly archaic.
There may be a lesson to be drawn from this for an understanding
of the place of the criminal law in the determination of standards of
morality. The criminal code reflects, rather than creates, sexual
mores, but social changes begin to modify sexual mores before they
produce corresponding modifications of the criminal law. The criminal
law therefore tends to support the more old-fashioned and conserva-
tive concepts of sexual morality. In countries where the law continues
to stigmatize abortion, homosexuality or adultery as crimes, sections of
the public who disapprove of these things have an unfair monopoly of
denunciation. The individuals concerned cannot answer back without
the risk of incurring penal sanctions, while their supporters are handi-
capped by the fact that they seem to be advocating defiance of estab-
lished law. Once such matters cease to be crimes, and become purely
moral issues, they can be discussed on their merits. The continued
existence of outmoded laws discourages unprejudiced debate and may
indeed impede the development of enlightened moral concepts. Al-
3. See WOLFENDEN REPORT, REPORT OF THE COMMIrrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OF-
FENCES AND PROSTITUTION app. III (authorized Amer. ed. 1963).
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though it is fashionable to draw a contrast between law and morals,
there is an important interaction between the two. This was felt
strongly by many of the advocates of homosexual law reform in Eng-
land, who saw that a certain moral stigma, and an inevitable associ-
ation with the seedy underworld, was inseparable in the public mind
from any category of persons officially defined as criminals.
It used to be argued in England, and is still argued in some quar-
ters in America, that more harm than good may come from agitating
against laws that have become obsolete. Why bother to repeal stat-
utes which forbid certain sexual acts when, in practice, people are no
longer prosecuted for what they may do discreetly in private: The
answer is that so long as a law stands, someone, somewhere, may apply
it. Malicious denunciation from motives of personal enmity, or pros-
ecutions resulting from over-zealous police inquiries-perhaps as a
by-product of investigations into other matters-are still possibilities to
be reckoned with.
Professor Barnett advocates a line of attack not available in Eng-
land. He claims that the various state laws against sodomy may be
invalidated on the ground that they contravene provisions of the Ameri-
can Constitution. The bulk of his book consists of a survey of legal ar-
guments and relevant legal cases bearing upon this contention. It
is a most impressively documented and scholarly survey. Whether it
will convince experts in American constitutional law remains to be
seen. To a layman, some of the arguments seem both ingenious and un-
expected. For instance, it is argued that the first amendment, which
prohibits laws respecting an establishment of religion, not only prevents
government from making any particular religion the official one, but
also implies that the state may not impose rules of conduct which
originate in the dictates of any particular religion. For example, in
the case of Epperson v. Arkansas4 the United States Supreme Court
invoked the establishment clause to invalidate a state law prohibiting
the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution in the schools. Pro-
fessor Barnett argues that the sodomy statutes have a specifically
Judeo-Christian biblical origin, whereas other ancient religious cul-
tures, in Greece and Japan for example, held homosexuality in esteem.
So long as it can be shown that the sodomy laws do not serve secular
as well as religious purposes, they are open to challenge as being
merely an expression of Christian dogma. The sodomy laws are pe-
4. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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culiar in penalising particular physical sexual acts, regardless of circum-
stances or mutual consent or absence of harm to anyone. This attribu-
tion of enormous significance to trivial details of bedroom behaviour
is a species of magical thinking which stems from religious beliefs, but
has no secular justification.
Some of the arguments cited by Professor Barnett are much more
powerful than this and have already been applied with a measure of
success in cases closely related to those of homosexual defendants.
The eighth amendment forbids the infliction of "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment," and this has been held to include punishment that is exces-
sive in proportion to the gravity of the offense. It thus becomes possi-
ble to argue that a punitive sentence for consensual sodomy in one
state is "cruel and unusuar' in view of the fact that other states of the
Union and other legal systems impose no penalty whatsoever for the
same behaviour. It can also be argued that punishment of a person
for the consequences of a condition over which he has no control is
unconstitutionally cruel. The argument was raised in Robinson v Cal-
ifornia5 in relation to narcotics addiction where it was held that a status
or condition, as opposed to an overt antisocial act, cannot be made
criminal.
Essential personal liberties are protected by the doctrine of in-
dependent rights, which requires justification for any governmental
intereference with personal liberty. In Griswold v Connecticut,o which
invalidated a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, a married
couple's constitutional right of privacy was held to have been infringed.
It could be argued, however, that all men and women, whether hetero-
sexual or homosexual, have a constitutional right to private sexual ex-
pression. The only cases in which sodomy laws have been challenged
as an unconstitutional attack upon personal freedom have so far related
to sexual acts in public or with minors. The courts have had little
difficulty in rejecting such pleas on the grounds that the laws curtailed
individual liberty by reason of a compelling public interest.
For the average homosexual, the sodomy laws, because they are
so largely unenforced or unenforceable, have relatively little direct im-
pact on everyday life, although the potential threat of prosecution al-
ways causes anxiety in the background. Far more important is the
discrimination against homosexuals in such spheres as government
5. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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employment, tenancy agreements, immigration and the formation of
associations or clubs where they can meet others of their kind.
The fourteenth amendment provides for the equal protection of
the laws for all persons within the jurisdiction of the state. It has
been held by the Supreme Court that only compelling social objectives
can justify discrimination against any class of citizens.7 Although
Professor Barnett does not discuss relevant cases, the fact is that homo-
sexual activists have won a number of battles against discrimination in
situations in which there is no question of illegal sexual behaviour taking
place.8 A homosexual convicted of sexual misconduct is in a very dif-
ferent position. The majority of prosecutions under sodomy laws in-
volve aggravating circumstances, such as involvement of minors, prosti-
tution, public misconduct, or overt annoyance to neighbors, all of
which might be illegal if committed by heterosexuals. If a test case
of pure, consensual adult behaviour in private could be brought
up, it might be argued that the application of the sodomy laws to such a
case would be an unwarranted discrimination against homosexuals as
a class, since the laws seem to be refusing them the elementary rights
of private sexual expression which are considered necessary and allow-
able for heterosexuals.
To a layman, the construction of all these elaborate arguments
seems nothing more than the legal technician's way of securing a de-
sired result, namely the abolition of criminal sanctions for behaviour
which is no longer considered a threat to the community. The really
interesting question is why value judgments ate changing. Historically,
when venereal diseases were incurable and infant mortality meant that
abundant procreation was a necessity, sanctions against promiscuity,
or non-procreative sexual pleasures, made more sense. Today, with
over-population a problem and with the recognition that sexual expres-
sion is a need in itself, apart from reproduction, the old standards are
less relevant. The crucial question is this: What harm does con-
sensual homosexual conduct do to individuals or to the community at
large? If the answer is none, or very little, then criminal sanctions
are inappropriate and the law should be changed. Whether this will
happen by pressure of enlightened public opinion upon the legislature,
or by legal argument on constitutional grounds, remains to be seen.
7. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
8. See, e.g., Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (1965).
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